Stalins Falle: Er wollte den Krieg ("Stalin's Trap: He Wanted War")
Quote: Reviewed by Daniel W. Michaels
Until his death in July 1996, Adolf von Thadden (July 7, 1921 – July 16, 1996) was a prominent and respected figure in German "right wing" or "nationalist" (conservative) circles. In this, his final book, this prolific writer concisely and cogently explains why Hitler was compelled, for both political and military reasons, to launch his preemptive strike against the Soviet Union when and how he did. "Stalin's Trap" is also his final legacy to future generations, a sort of testament to young Germans.
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v18/v18n3p40_Michaels.html
Stalins Falle: Er wollte den Krieg ("Stalin's Trap: He Wanted War"), by Adolf von Thadden.
Rosenheim: Kultur und Zeitgeschichte/Archiv der Zeit, 1996. Hardcover. 170 pages. Photos. Bibliography.
This book was published 18 years ago, but I have to admit that I never heard this viewpoint before. Hitler didn't just go insane and invade an innocent Russia in 1941, but he believed a pre-emptive strike was necessary as Stalin would have invaded Germany soon.
Stalin's defense was always bluster. He killed off the old, he killed military officers, he still maintained threatening stance but really was not strong enough to attack Germany.
It was Hitler who attacked (in summer clothing) and gained ground when there was ever so much more ground to gain until eventually supply lines crumpled and Winter attacked.
Quote: pacomartin
This book was published 18 years ago, but I have to admit that I never heard this viewpoint before. Hitler didn't just go insane and invade an innocent Russia in 1941, but he believed a pre-emptive strike was necessary as Stalin would have invaded Germany soon.
Hitler had the problem that he wanted to be allies with the Brits and hated the Russians. He got what he did not want. If he had concentrated his forces on Moscow instead of a three city split, Operation Barbarossa would have succeeded. If he had been able to get Japan to attack in the west, make a temporary alliance with them, he would have succeeded.
It was a matter of timing and momentum. He knew the invasion would come and better to knock out the USSR fast. If he had reached Moscow the Allied Invasion would have been far harder, might not have been possible. His insanity came in not wanting to accept that he needed to change his tactics and concentrate on Moscow only.
Quote: pacomartinQuote: Reviewed by Daniel W. Michaels
Until his death in July 1996, Adolf von Thadden (July 7, 1921 – July 16, 1996) was a prominent and respected figure in German "right wing" or "nationalist" (conservative) circles. In this, his final book, this prolific writer concisely and cogently explains why Hitler was compelled, for both political and military reasons, to launch his preemptive strike against the Soviet Union when and how he did. "Stalin's Trap" is also his final legacy to future generations, a sort of testament to young Germans.
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v18/v18n3p40_Michaels.html
Stalins Falle: Er wollte den Krieg ("Stalin's Trap: He Wanted War"), by Adolf von Thadden.
Rosenheim: Kultur und Zeitgeschichte/Archiv der Zeit, 1996. Hardcover. 170 pages. Photos. Bibliography.
This book was published 18 years ago, but I have to admit that I never heard this viewpoint before. Hitler didn't just go insane and invade an innocent Russia in 1941, but he believed a pre-emptive strike was necessary as Stalin would have invaded Germany soon.
Hitler was always gunning for a war in the East. It was a necessary and required part of his vision for a Greater Germany. He believed that the Germanic people's superiority was going to win the war, and that with the Liebensraum, he'd have the resources to keep the territory. Germany by 1941 was already needed resources from the east. They'd been getting them through trade since 1939, but Hitler and his buddies though that the Communist regime was weak.
Not only was it a mistake to split between Leningrad, Moscow and south (Stalingrad became the number one objective much later, the Caucaus oil fields were consider more important in the '42 summer offensive), he also failed to make friends with the people who initially saw Germany as a liberators in the Ukraine and Belarus. In '41, Hitler decided encircling and knocking out the troops around Kiev was more important than taking Moscow. He thought that taking out people was more important, and it was if he was fighting the Western Allies. The Germans doctrine would have been to keep a fighting force in supply (though Hitler didn't follow that, time and time again). In Russia, they could trade men and space for time. They did with Kiev. And across the South of Russia. Time is what Russia needed. It had more warm bodies than Germany, and once lend-lease was shipping in trucks and supplies, it had mobile men too.
I don't think taking Moscow would have knocked Russia out of the war. The Japanese holding down the eastern divisions would have been a game changer, but they wanted none of that. The relationship between Germany and Japan just wasn't that tight. Moscow's fall in 1941 would have led to a regime change. But as long as there was time to take the industry east, and eventually stabilize the line in the winter, Russia would be in the war. By the end of '41, the German advance was played out, and communication lines needed to catch up.
There's the same theory of pre-emptive strike from 'icebreaker' (I think) which says that the Russians were massing for a huge invasion themselves in '41 and the Barbarossa was so successful as the Russians were caught in advancement formations. I don't think this theory has much going for it.
